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Christian Egenhofer
Abstract 
Transport is the only sector in the EU where 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise. Unless this 
trend can be reversed, the EU will have little chance 
of reaching its objectives in the context of global 
obligations on industrialised countries to reduce their 
emissions between 80% and 95% by 2050 compared 
to 1990. Many different solutions exist, including, for 
example, new technology such as electrification of 
road transport, modal shift, optimising existing 
technologies and policy measures and more radical 
measures such as binding GHG emissions targets. 
While there is some merit to all of these approaches, 
this Policy Brief argues that current EU policy 
thinking is not (yet) bold enough to credibly tackle the 
GHG emissions challenge from transport. It argues 
that:  
•  The EU must take GHG emissions from the 
transport sector more seriously. 
•  Sound transport pricing is important but it has 
limitations for the transition to a low-carbon 
transport system. 
•  EU-level infrastructure policy is grossly 
inadequate, mainly but not only in view of the 
transformation of the EU transport system. 
•  There is too much (blind) faith in technology 
solutions, thereby avoiding hard questions on how 
to curb transport growth.  
•  Finally, well-designed technology deployment 
targets are a good way to start the transition to a 
low-carbon transport system.  
Introduction 
The transport sector is a strategic sector that is of 
fundamental importance to all economic activity. 
Transport services are an important input factor for all 
products. Transport costs affect competitiveness of 
European firms. Transport on its own also constitutes 
an important sector within the European economy. It 
contributes some 7% of GDP and more than 5% of 
total employment in the EU. Transport networks are 
the lifeblood of the EU internal market and a 
cornerstone of European integration. 
Progressive European integration, notably via 
successive waves of enlargement, has led to a 
substantial increase in transport volumes On average, 
passenger transport increased by 1.7% annually since 
1995 – mainly driven by air and road transport. 
Freight transport increased by 2.7% over the same 
period, primarily by road and sea. These 
developments have led to a recognition of the 
negative side-effects of mass transport in Europe, 
including the deterioration of infrastructure, misuse of 
land, congestion, air and noise pollution, increasing 
oil import dependency, injuries and deaths, as well as 
substantial amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. 
The latter is of particular concern. European transport 
GHG emissions keep rising quickly and with transport 
emissions accounting for almost a quarter of total 
GHG emissions, control and ultimately reduction of 
them will be a precondition for a credible new EU 
climate change strategy. Transport is a sector that 
offers high potential for developing new, low-carbon 2 | Christian Egenhofer  
technologies. If the European Commission and 
member states are serious about the new post-
Copenhagen narrative, i.e. that climate change policy 
has shifted from “reducing emissions” to “developing 
future low-carbon technologies” to stay at the front of 
the race for global technological leadership, then 
transport must not be overlooked.  
The important role played by transport in the EU 
economic growth strategy was highlighted by 
European Commission President Barroso in the 
Political Guidelines for the next Commission 
(Barroso, 2009) which stressed the need to maintain 
the momentum towards a low-carbon economy and 
decarbonising the transport sector in particular. In the 
Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 
2010a), the European Commission finally announced 
new proposals to decarbonise transport, linked those 
with the wider sustainable growth agenda. 
1.  EU greenhouse gas emissions from 
transport need to be taken more 
seriously  
According to the European Commission’s own 
evaluation, the EU Common Transport Policy has 
seen good progress in some areas, notably the 
liberalisation of transport services, safety and the 
strengthening of passenger rights. Arguably, it has 
also “assisted social and economic cohesion and 
promoted competitiveness of European industry, 
therefore contributing significantly to the Lisbon 
Agenda for Growth and Jobs” (European 
Commission, 2009). There has been less movement in 
designing an integrated response to rising GHG 
emissions, security of energy supply risks and the 
transport sector’s innovation challenges arising from 
the need to fight climate change. EU transport policy 
has failed to deliver on reducing GHG emissions for 
example by shifting towards low-carbon modes and 
reversing the decline of rail as well as decoupling of 
freight transport growth from economic growth. The 
situation has been aggravated by the lack of adequate 
infrastructure funding and development and to an 
extent, the absence of efficient and effective pricing 
including externalities (European Commission, 2009). 
In 2007 – the year for which the latest comprehensive 
set of figures is available – transport was responsible 
for almost a quarter
1 of total GHG emissions in the 
EU27. This represents an increase of 36% since 1990 
and compares with a 15% reduction in GHG 
emissions across all non-transport sectors when 
                                                      
1 Transport accounted for 24% of total EU27 GHG 
emissions including international aviation and maritime 
navigation. Excluding the latter – as the Kyoto Protocol 
does – transport amounted to 19.5% of total GHG 
emissions (EEA, 2009: p. 21). 
compared to 1990 levels.
2 More than two-thirds of 
transport-related greenhouse gas emissions originate 
from road transport. 
Transport remains the only sector where emissions 
continue to rise, mainly due to growing transport 
demand, which is more than offsetting efficiency 
improvements, mainly in passenger cars (EEA, 2009: 
p. 43). In addition, there is a relative decrease in the 
use of public transport (by passengers) as well as an 
increased share of road freight transport as opposed to 
other transport modes.
 3 The European Environment 
Agency concludes that the modal shift is therefore 
taking place in the wrong direction, especially in the 
EU12, i.e. the member states that joined after in or 
after 2004 (EEA, 2009: p.43). 
Transport is one of the largest energy-consuming 
sectors, accounting for one-third of EU final energy 
consumption.  
Figure 1. Projected GHG emissions growth: The 
transport vs non-transport sector 
 
Source: European Commission. 
Under a business as usual scenario, volumes in all 
transport modes are projected to increase 
substantially, but most dramatically for road freight 
and passenger transport. Low-carbon modes are 
expected to grow less. For example, Skinner et al. 
(2010: p. vii), assuming a continuation of recent 
improvements in vehicle efficiency, expected that 
transport’s GHG emissions in 2050 would be 74% 
higher than they were in 1990 and around 25% above 
2010 levels. This increase is expected to be fed by 
growth in transport demand, particularly for maritime 
transport (+87% from 2010 to 2050), aviation 
(+103%) and road freight (+79%). As a result, the 
GHG emissions of maritime transport are projected to 
                                                      
2 See the website of the European Commission, DG 
Climate Action 
(http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en.htm). 
3 Freight and passenger road transport accounted for 94% 
of total transport-related GHG emissions in 2007 (71% 
when international aviation and maritime navigation are 
included), against 2% (15%) for navigation, 2% (12%) for 
civil aviation and 0.8% (0.7%) for railways (European 
Commission, 2010c).  The new EU transport policy | 3 
increase by more than 65% between 2010 and 2050, 
while those of aviation and road freight are 
anticipated to rise by more than 50% and 45%, 
respectively. 
This would mean that in the period around 2040 to 
2050, transport emissions would overtake all other 
GHG emissions combined. This would be 
incompatible with EU and international climate 
targets.
4 
2.  The importance and limitations of 
sound transport pricing  
It has been an objective of EU transport policy for 
some time to develop a rational transport pricing 
system, where modes pay for their full costs, to allow 
for undistorted competition within and between 
modes. Proper pricing would also mean making 
available funds for infrastructure investment.  
However, transport also creates emissions, 
congestion, noise and accidents and imposes high 
(external) costs on society, which are not expressed in 
the market price that consumers pay. These can be 
addressed by regulation or by internalisation of 
external costs through for example taxation. Both 
regulation and taxation would create incentives to 
shift to more efficient technologies, use existing 
modes more efficiently or use different modes, e.g. 
lower-carbon transport modes.  
The fuel price, including the price for CO2 and the 
internalisation of other externalities, is an important 
driver of the long-term evolution in all three areas. At 
the same time, such an approach has limitations. At 
this stage there is too much uncertainty on the true 
cost of climate change to calculate a reliable figure for 
the ‘climate change externality’.
5 Dealing with 
external costs is complicated by the fact that transport 
taxes are levied at the member state level and are 
largely fed by objectives other than internalising 
external costs. The transport sector often benefits 
from open or hidden subsidies, which can provide 
perverse incentives. These include for example car 
registration taxes not aligned with policy objectives, 
                                                      
4 The European Council of 29-30 October 2009, called 
“upon all Parties … to agree to global emission reductions 
of at least 50%, and aggregate developed country emissions 
reductions of at least 80-95%”... and supported “an EU 
objective, in the context of necessary reductions according 
to the IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce 
emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels”. 
5 For example, long-term damage cost estimates do not yet 
include all possible long-term risks, such as the feedback 
mechanisms that may occur in the world climate system 
that could lead to much more rapid and dramatic climate 
changes. In addition, there are major regional and local 
variations of impacts (see Núñez Ferrer et al., 2010). 
tax deductions for journeys to and from work, tax-free 
shopping at international airports and on international 
ferries and the tax regime for company cars or a lack 
of enforcement of laws. A recent study commissioned 
by DG TAXUD of the European Commission has 
found that company car taxation in the EU actually 
boosts CO2  emissions rather than curbing these 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2010). 
Rationalising tax policies, for example, by eliminating 
hidden subsidies and perverse incentives and 
internalising external costs e.g. by including a CO2 
charge in fuel taxation and using ‘kilometre charging’ 
to internalise the external costs of air pollution and 
congestion can stimulate less carbon-intensive modes. 
Yet, pricing alone is most likely not sufficient to 
stimulate the transition to a low-carbon transport 
sector. For the delivery of a virtually carbon-neutral 
transport system, the stimulation of least-cost options 
might not be appropriate. Some of the technology 
options that are not yet cost effective have long lead 
times and therefore need to be implemented at an 
early stage to ensure that they contribute to meeting 
the 2050 targets. Therefore, additional support, partly 
for R&D and demonstration but mainly for 
deployment of new low-carbon technologies, for 
example in the form of a Strategic Transport 
Technology Plan – as currently discussed – will be 
needed. This will explicitly need to include the 
development of adequate infrastructures and related 
services, ideally founded on a coherent economic and 
fiscal policy framework. Integrating co-benefits will 
help minimise the social costs of the transition. 
 
3.  EU infrastructure policy is inadequate  
The Trans-European Network (TEN-T), having been 
nominated in 1996 as the main instrument to deal with 
infrastructure, needs to be adapted to current and 
future challenges arising from growing mobility 
needs, urban development, scarcity of fossil fuels, 
climate change and environmental protection. The 
TEN-T policy is not driven by genuine EU objectives, 
as a result of a lack of funding and sovereign 
responsibility by the member states in infrastructure 
planning. This has not been reversed, despite the 
attempt to boost TEN-T development through the EU 
economic recovery plan. The way in which TEN-T 
projects have been designed so far (network layer + 
priority projects) fails to integrate the different 
transport modes and does not provide for an optimal 
functioning of transport elements (infrastructures, 
nodes, ICT applications, network services, operational 
and administrative procedures), which should work in 
combination in order to promote co-modality, modal 
shift and an efficient and effective organisation of the 
whole transport system.  4 | Christian Egenhofer  
Moreover, TEN-T policy as it now stands is not 
driven by climate change mitigation and adaptation 
objectives, not does it offer solutions to the need to 
transform the European transport infrastructure to the 
requirements of a low-carbon system. Recognising the 
need to review the current TEN-T policy to put it to 
service for the EU Transport Policy, the European 
Commission (2010b) recently discussed whether to 
make GHG emissions reductions from transport an 
overarching objective of this EU policy. While this is 
in an interesting suggestion, success will depend on 
whether the EU will manage to address member state 
sensitivities regarding their sovereign responsibility in 
the field of infrastructure planning and 
implementation but also on whether the European 
Commission can develop a more operational strategy 
to make such a paradigm shift effectively happen. 
4.  Blind faith in technological solutions? 
Nobody can contest that a low-carbon EU transport 
system depends on technology advances across the 
transport sector. But it is equally true that technology 
alone – by a wide margin – will not be able to achieve 
EU long-term climate change objectives. This is the 
conclusion of most, if not all projections and 
scenarios.
6 This becomes evident when comparing 
projected transport growth and EU climate change 
objectives. To take just one example, for the EU to 
meet its climate change objectives, the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (2010) estimates 
that EU transport emissions as a whole will have to be 
reduced in 2050 from baseline projections by a factor 
of 12. For road passenger the factor is somewhere 
between 20 or 25. Given the already ambitious 
assumptions underlying the technical scenarios, it 
would be very challenging (if not impossible) to 
deliver such levels of GHG emissions reduction by 
stimulating technical options alone, particularly in 
light of the significant uncertainties and risks 
associated with the principal alternative fuels and 
energy carriers (e.g. land-use constraints, 
technological and infrastructure challenges). It should 
also not be forgotten that the modes with the largest 
projected growth (e.g. aviation) have relatively fewer 
decarbonisation options and often have slower fleet 
turnovers. 
It is therefore essential that both technical and non-
technical options are pursued. Instead of relying on a 
number of key technologies, a sound transport policy 
will require a portfolio of different measures. This 
will necessarily need to include measures to curb 
demand, if the EU commitment is serious about 
reaching its self-proclaimed climate targets.  
                                                      
6 See e.g. IEA (2010), Skinner et al. (2010) and 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2009). 
5.  What next?  
Similarly to the energy sector, a successful low-
carbon transport strategy will need to accelerate the 
natural rate of investment, i.e. beyond what the 
market would judge being profitable. This will require 
additional support, partly for R&D and demonstration 
but mainly for deployment of new low-carbon 
technologies, for example in the form of the Strategic 
Transport Technology Plan, as is being discussed at 
the moment.  
In addition to the technology push for example by the 
Strategic Transport Technology Plan, a number of 
policies, such as regulation, standards or economic 
instruments, can enhance the market pull. They 
include performance standards for vehicles, other 
standards (e.g. for alternative fuels, infrastructures or 
products), elimination of existing harmful subsidies 
and the use economic instruments to harmonise 
taxation and bring it in line with low-carbon 
objectives. 
A particular challenge will be the development of 
new, low-carbon infrastructures in addition to the 
replacement of existing ageing and congested 
infrastructure. The experiences of the TEN-T offers a 
telling reminder that without some ‘Europeanisation’ 
of planning and financing, EU infrastructure risks 
being dominated by national interests, lacking inter-
operability and thereby intra- and inter-modal 
competition; continuing to be deficient in solidarity,
7 
missing an efficient (i.e. EU-wide) pricing system and 
therefore failing to meet the needs of Europe’s 
transport sector during the transformation phase. 
Previous attempts by the European Commission have 
remained a patchwork of initiatives, mainly as a result 
of member states’ reluctance to cede too much power 
to the EU. It is difficult to see how such infrastructure 
can be built without a dedicated EU fund for 
sustainable transport infrastructure.  
In addition, we should not forget that critical to 
achieving low-carbon transport in the EU is timely 
international action on greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation and maritime transport. In the absence of 
global action on aviation and maritime transport, the 
EU should develop domestic policies to address at 
least the emissions it can. For aviation this has 
happened by including the sector into the EU ETS. 
Action on maritime is still awaited. 
 
                                                      
7 For example, in the case of rail infrastructure investment 
in member states from Central and Eastern Europe or alpine 
transit.  The new EU transport policy | 5 
6.  Are GHG emissions targets for EU 
transport really such a bad thing?  
Add-on policies alone cannot achieve the envisaged 
emissions reductions in EU transport, with the 
implication that the other sectors, notably energy, 
would have to achieve even steeper emissions 
reductions than currently projected as compensation.   
Will an EU transport policy be able give direction and 
ensure coherence without a headline objective, i.e. 
target? The climate and energy package agreed in 
2008 has implicitly set the GHG objective as a 
headline target, while ensuring that other objectives 
such as security of supply and competitiveness are not 
jeopardised. This has been achieved by testing the 
impacts of the GHG target on the other objectives.  
One can make a case that the GHG emissions 
reduction target will indeed need to become the 
headline objective for transport in light of the steep 
reductions needed. A long-term target can give a clear 
signal to the transport sector and will, over time, 
benefit low-carbon modes. Expressed differently, is it 
possibly to devise a European low-carbon transport 
strategy in the absence of a target? 
Distinguishing targets  
Targets can be useful in achieving policy objectives or 
moving sectors in a certain direction. And even if 
targets are not met in full, the result is likely still to be 
better than what would have been obtained in their 
absence. 
Targets have been used by the EU to achieve policy 
objectives since its beginnings. The European 
Economic Community Treaty set a target for creating 
a Customs Union, which was achieved ahead of 
schedule. A similar approach was used to create the 
internal market by 1992. On various occasions since 
then, the EU has attempted to apply this apparently 
successful formula. The recent EU record on targets, 
however, is uneven. Witness the difficulties to make 
progress towards achieving the Lisbon target to 
transform Europe into “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010”, or 
meeting the Maastricht criteria or the positive 
example of the climate change targets of the climate 
and energy package. 
It is important to distinguish among different 
categories of targets. The first are hard targets, such 
as the greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets 
under the climate and energy package. These are 
legally binding, and enforceable. A distinct category 
contains indicative targets. The first 2001 Directive on 
renewable energy for electricity and for biofuels is an 
example. Targets are still mandatory but differ from 
hard targets in the level of commitment required. 
Member states need to make an effort to meet them, 
but they can divert from them to some degree if they 
have good reasons. It is unclear how a lack of 
achievement will be sanctioned. A final category 
includes aspirational targets. These express long-term 
objectives or aspirations, such as the EU target that 
“the overall global mean surface temperature increase 
should not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels” or 
a 15-30% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020. The 
so-called ‘Lisbon objective’ of making the EU the 
most competitive economy falls in the same category. 
Such targets are meant to guide policy-making.  
One should distinguish between legally-binding 
obligations based on EU policies and targets. An 
example of the former is the EU emissions trading 
system (ETS), the renewable targets enshrined in the 
2009 renewables Directive. They are binding EU 
laws, enforceable by the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice. 
Targets best practice   
If we accept that targets are a good means to express a 
vision of what the EU and its member states hope to 
achieve, they need to be long-term to allow sufficient 
time for the necessary investment to follow.
8 At the 
same time, targets need to be credible. Credibility 
increases when targets are realistic, achievable and 
backed by plausible implementation strategies either 
at member state or EU level. Targets need to be built 
upon indicators or even better, they should be 
quantifiable in order to ensure that their achievement 
can be measured. Since targets constitute a significant 
intervention, they should only be applied in cases 
where the objective to be achieved is significant. 
There should only be a few, and ideally only one 
target, to avoid the incompatibility of targets which 
creates additional rigidity. 
Targets should concentrate on outcomes (e.g. the 
development of near-zero carbon technologies) 
instead of prescribing the solution (e.g. EVs, 
hydrogen cars). In that way, the market, steered by 
member states’ policies, will choose the most 
appropriate solution.  
Targets are best expressed on an EU-wide basis in 
order to ensure that resources are optimally allocated. 
If targets are expressed at member state level, policy 
should be designed in such a way that obligations are 
‘tradable’ across borders to achieve scale, 
convergence and efficient allocation across member 
states. If subsidies are used, the overall level of 
subsidy for the same product or service per member 
state should be comparable, preventing investors from 
shopping around and starting a race for subsidies. 
                                                      
8 For more details, see Egenhofer (2007). 6 | Christian Egenhofer  
What targets for transport?   
What are the best kinds of targets to adopt in order to 
fulfil the EU’s low-carbon transport objectives? 
a)  Hard targets, for example, for renewable energy, 
hardly seem to be an appropriate approach to 
drive the transport transition. The high uncertainty 
surrounding the technology (availability and 
costs) would not make such a target very credible.  
b)  Aspirational targets are not much more than a 
government declaration and generally do not 
trigger commitment by business and investors, 
unless they are translated into firm government 
policies.  
c)  Transport could also be included in the EU 
Emissions Trading System. This would put a 
ceiling on EU transport emissions and provide 
steering to less carbon-intensive modes. One of 
the principal questions with such an approach is 
whether diffuse sources are best covered by an 
ETS. The ETS to date is designed to cover large 
stationary emissions sources. A second issue is 
that the steering function of the ETS most likely 
would only kick-in the long-term, after 2030 or 
even later. To allow the ETS to steer transport 
would require a CO2 price far above the existing 
and realistically expected price. Most studies 
assume that transport costs of between €100 and 
€200 per tonne can trigger significant abatement. 
In the absence of a global agreement where 
carbon is priced worldwide, however, such a price 
is unrealistic given the concerns over 
competitiveness of the industrial sector under the 
ETS. A significantly lower price would therefore 
leave the transport sector with little incentive to 
abate and innovate as it could pay its way by 
buying allowances. Early action to start 
innovating has however been identified as a 
crucial condition for EU transport policy.  
d)  The latter problem – low CO2 price – could be 
avoided by introducing a separate emissions 
trading system for the transport sector. However, 
this would require replacing the current system of 
excise duties, for petrol and diesel and other 
transport fuels in order to avoid double regulation. 
While this in itself would be a long-term task, 
given its significant implications for member 
states’ fiscal policies, such a system would be 
much more complex. Moreover, a separate 
emissions trading system for transport would lack 
the flexibility of enabling abatement options to be 
taken up across various sectors, thereby failing to 
deliver one of the principal advantage of an ETS, 
i.e. least-cost abatement. 
e)  This leaves us with indicative targets, i.e. the 
member states or the EU as a whole would 
express certain commitments as a somewhat in-
between solution. Indicative targets are less rigid 
and therefore more credible, have a long-term 
dimension but at the same time also face 
credibility problems with investors. Why would 
one want to invest, if governments do not 
translate these commitments into firm policies? 
Thinking about technology deployment 
targets   
The crux of the matter is how to frame and phrase 
government targets or commitments to meet EU long-
term climate and innovation objectives. Any target 
therefore will need to be examined in light of its 
potential to drive industrial transformation. This is 
complicated by the fact that low carbon transport will 
require co-development of different new technologies, 
new fuels (biofuels) and new energy carriers 
(electricity, hydrogen), transport modes (road, rail, 
intermodal), services responding to customers’ needs 
as well as associated infrastructures and a regulatory 
framework. To some extent, this will require trial and 
error, and by extension, giving the solution provider 
sufficient flexibility to research, test and market new 
approaches and technologies.  
As most of the investment (and much of the R&D) 
will originate from industry and private investors, the 
key to success is to generate an appropriate economic 
environment, ensuring industry buy-in.  
The most promising way to steer the transport sector 
has been to develop a set of indicators capable of 
measuring the (gradual) progress towards the EU’s 
transport carbon objectives, mode by mode. This 
would on the one hand integrate customers’ 
perspectives into policy-making and thereby ensure 
customers’ responsiveness. On the other hand and 
more importantly, such indicators would provide 
guidance for technology and equipment companies, 
service providers and investors alike and ultimately 
have a high possibility to ensure management buy-in. 
To date, such indicators are not yet developed, but 
they should not be too difficult to devise. An example 
of a set of indicators in the rail freight sector could be 
i) reliable availability of rolling stock, ii) flexible train 
configurations, iii) availability of integrated mobility 
hubs, iv) availability of a tracking system to 
customers, etc. In the case of EVs, such criteria could 
include for example, a commitment from each 
member state to: i) a number of pilot projects in 
relation to its population and/or GDP, ii) a certain 
number of charging stations, iii) a certain number of 
hybrid plug-ins or other innovation solutions, iv) kms 
of smart grids, etc. 
Technology deployment targets offer several 
advantages: 
•  testing innovative technologies on site, The new EU transport policy | 7 
•  identifying and finding solutions for technology 
integration issues,  
•  ensuring management buy-in and  
•  if properly managed, the ability to integrate 
customer orientation at an early stage. 
Ultimately, only those technologies that respond to 
customer needs and pass a customer responsiveness 
threshold will be successful in the market. Too many 
technologies have been developed that placed 
excessive emphasis on the supply side – only to fail to 
be adopted by the market at scale. 
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•	 To	provide	a	regular	flow	of	authoritative	
publications	offering	policy	analysis	and	
recommendations.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	our	
publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Multidisciplinary,	multinational	&	multicultural	
research	team.	
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Seven	research	networks,	comprising	numerous	
other	highly	reputable	institutes,	to	complement	
and	consolidate	CEPS’	research	expertise	and	to	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	Corporate	and	
Institutional	Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	
practical	experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	
for	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies •	
Financial	Markets	&	Institutions •	
Energy	&	Climate	Change	 •	
Regulatory	Policy •	
EU	Foreign,	Security	&	Neighbourhood	Policy •	
Justice	&	Home	Affairs •	
Politics	&	Institutions •	
Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy •	
Research	Networks
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI) •	
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP) •	
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI) •	
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation		 	 •	
	 (ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy		 	 •	
	 Research	Institutes	(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN) •	
European	Security	Forum	(ESF) •	
CEPS	organises	a	variety	of	activities,	involving	its	
members	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	European	
policy	debate,	including	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	
NGOs	and	the	media.	Its	funding	is	obtained	
from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	membership	
fees,	project	research,	foundation	grants,	
conferences	fees,	publication	sales	and	an	annual	
grant	from	the	European	Commission.